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Feldstein and Horioka upset conventional wisdom in  1980 when  they con- 
cluded that changes in countries’ rates of  national saving had a very  large 
effect on their rates of  investment, and interpreted this finding as evidence of 
low capital mobility. Although their regressions have been subject to a great 
variety of criticisms, their basic finding seems to hold up. But does it imply 
imperfect capital mobility? 
Let us begin by  asking why we would ever expect a shortfall in one coun- 
try’s national saving not to reduce the overall availability of funds and thereby 
crowd out investment projects that  might otherwise be undertaken in  that 
country. After all, national saving and investment are linked through an iden- 
tity. (The variable that completes the identity is, of course, the current account 
balance.) 
The aggregation together of all forms of “capital” has caused more than the 
usual amount of  confusion in the literature on international capital mobility. 
Nobody  ever claimed that  international flows of  foreign direct investment 
were large enough that a typical investment project in the domestic country 
would costlessly be undertaken directly by a foreign company when there was 
a shortfall in  domestic saving.’ Rather, the  argument was  that the typical 
American corporation could borrow at the going interest rate in order to fi- 
nance its investment projects and, if  the degree of capital mobility was suffi- 
ciently high, the going interest rate would be tied down to the world interest 
rate by international flows of portfolio capital. If  portfolio capital were a per- 
fect substitute for physical capital, then the difference would be immaterial; 
but the two types of capital probably are not in fact perfect substitutes. 
This paper examines a number of alternative ways of quantifying the degree 
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of international capital mobility. One conclusion is that the barriers to cross- 
border flows are sufficiently low that, by  1989, financial markets can be said 
to be virtually completely integrated among the large industrial countries (and 
among some smaller countries as well). But this is a different proposition from 
saying that  real  interest rates are equalized across countries, which is still 
different from saying that investment projects in a country are unaffected by a 
shortfall in national saving. We  will see that there are several crucial links that 
can, and probably do, fail to hold. 
In many cases, notably the United Kingdom and Japan (and perhaps now 
Italy and France as well), the finding of high integration with world financial 
markets is a relatively new one, attributable to liberalization programs over 
the last 10 years. Even in the case of financial markets in the United States, 
integration with the Euromarkets appears to have been incomplete as recently 
as 1982.*  An important conclusion of  this paper for the United States is that 
the current account deficits of the 1980s have been large enough, and by now 
have lasted long enough, to reduce significantly estimates of  the correlation 
between saving and investment. The increased degree of worldwide financial 
integration since 1979 is identified as one likely factor that has allowed such 
large capital flows to take place over the past decade. But even if U.S. interest 
rates are now viewed as tied to world interest rates,3 there are still other weak 
links in the chain. The implication is that crowding out of  domestic invest- 
ment can still take place. 
8.1  Four Alternative Definitions of International Capital Mobility 
By  the  second half of  the  1970s, international economists had  come to 
speak of the world financial system as characterized by perfect capital mobil- 
ity. In many ways, this was “jumping the gun.” It is true that financial integra- 
tion had been greatly enhanced after 1973 by the removal of capital controls 
on the part of  the  United  States,  Germany, Canada,  Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands; by the steady process of  technical and institutional innovation, 
particularly in the Euromarkets; and by the recycling of OPEC surpluses to 
developing countries. But almost all developing countries retained extensive 
restrictions on international capital flows, as did a majority of industrialized 
countries. Even among the five major countries without capital controls, cap- 
ital was not perfectly mobile by some definitions. 
There are at least four distinct definitions of perfect capital mobility that are 
in widespread use. (1) The Feldstein-Horioka dej5nition: exogenous changes 
in national saving (i.e., in either private savings or government budgets) can 
be easily financed by borrowing from abroad at the going real interest rate, 
and thus need not crowd out investment in the originating country (except 
perhaps to the extent that the country is large in world financial markets). (2) 
Real  interest parity: International capital flows equalize real  interest rates 229  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s 
across countries. (3) Uncovered interest parity: Capital flows equalize ex- 
pected rates of return on countries’ bonds, despite exposure to exchange risk. 
(4)  Closed interest parity: Capital flows equalize interest rates across coun- 
tries when contracted in a common currency. These four possible definitions 
are in ascending order of  specificity. Only the last condition is an unalloyed 
criterion for capital mobility in the sense of  the degree of financial market 
integration across national b~undaries.~ 
As we will see, each of the first three conditions, if it is to hold, requires an 
auxiliary assumption in addition to the condition that follows it. Uncovered 
interest parity requires not only closed (or covered) interest parity, but also the 
condition that the exchange risk premium is zero. Real interest parity requires 
not only uncovered interest parity, but also the condition that expected real 
depreciation is zero. The Feldstein-Horioka condition requires not only real 
interest parity, but also a certain condition on the determinants of investment. 
But even though the relevance to the degree of integration of financial markets 
decreases as auxiliary conditions are added, the relevance to questions regard- 
ing the origin of  international payments imbalances increases. We  begin our 
consideration of  the various criteria of capital mobility with the Feldstein- 
Horioka definition. 
8.2  Feldstein-Horioka  Tests 
The Feldstein-Horioka definition requires that the country’s real  interest 
rate is tied to the world real interest rate by criterion 2; it is, after all, the real 
interest rather than the nominal on which saving and investment in  theory 
depend. But for criterion 1 to hold, it is also necessary that any and all deter- 
minants of a country’s rate of  investment other than its real interest rate be 
uncorrelated with its rate of national saving. Let the investment rate be given 
(1)  (Z/Y)i = a - br, + u,, 
where I is the level of capital formation, Y is national output, r is the domestic 
real interest rate, and  u represents all other factors, whether quantifiable or 
not, that determine the rate of  investment. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) re- 
gressed the investment rate against the national saving rate, 
by 
where NS is private saving minus the budget deficit. To get the zero coefficient 
B that they were looking for requires not only real interest parity: 
ri - r*  = 0 
(with the world interest rate r*  exogenous or in any other way uncorrelated 
with [NSIY 1,) but also a zero correlation between ui  and (NSIY),. 230  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
8.2.1  The Saving-Investment literature 
Feldstein and Horioka’s finding that the coefficient B is in fact closer to one 
than to zero has been reproduced many times. Most authors have not been 
willing, however, to follow them in drawing the inference that financial mar- 
kets are not highly integrated. There have been many econometric critiques, 
falling into two general categories. 
Most commonly made is the point that national saving is endogenous or, in 
our terms, is correlated with u,.  This will be the case if national saving and 
investment are both procyclical, as they are in fact known to be, or if they 
both respond to the population or productivity growth  rate^.^ It  will also be 
the case if  governments respond endogenously to incipient current account 
imbalances with policies to change public (or private) saving in such a way as 
to reduce the imbalances. This “policy reaction” argument has been made by 
Fieleke (1982), Tobin (1983), Westphal (1983), Capri0 and Howard (1984), 
Summers (1988), Roubini (1988) and Bayoumi  (1989). But Feldstein and 
Horioka made an effort to handle the econometric endogenity of national sav- 
ing, more so than have some of their critics. To handle the cyclical endogene- 
ity, they computed averages over a long enough period of  time that business 
cycles could be argued to wash out. To handle other sources of  endogeneity, 
they used demographic variables as instrumental variables for the saving rate. 
The other econometric critique is that if the domestic country is large in 
world financial markets, r* will not be exogenous with respect to (NSIY),  ,  and 
therefore even if r = r*, r and in turn (Z/Y),  will be correlated with (NS/Y),. 
In other words, a shortfall in domestic savings will drive up the world interest 
rate, and thus crowd out investment in the domestic country as well as abroad. 
This “large-country” argument has been made by  Murphy (1984) and Tobin 
(1983). An insufficiently appreciated point is that the large-country argument 
does not create a problem in cross-section studies, because all countries share 
the same world interest rate r*. Since r* simply goes into the constant term in 
a cross-section regression, it cannot be the source of any correlation with the 
right-hand-side variable. The large-country problem cannot explain why the 
countries that are high-saving relative to the average tend to coincide with the 
countries that are high-investing relative to the average.6 
If  the regressions of saving and investment rates were a good test for bar- 
riers to financial market integration, one would expect to see the coefficient 
falling over time. Until now, the evidence has if  anything showed the coeffi- 
cient rising over time rather than falling. This finding has emerged both from 
cross-section studies,  which  typically report  pre-  and  post- 1973 results- 
Feldstein (1983), Penati and Dooley (1984), and Dooley, Frankel and Mathie- 
son (1987)-and  from pure time-series studies-Obstfeld  (1986, 1989)’ and 
Frankel (1986) for the United States. The econometric endogeneity of national 
saving does not appear to be the explanation for this finding, because it holds 
equally well when instrumental variables are used.8 231  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the  1980s 
The easy explanation for the finding is that, econometric problems aside, 
real interest parity-criterion  2 above-has  not held any better in recent years 
than it did in the past. Mishkin (1984a, 1352), for example, found even more 
significant rejections of real interest parity among major industrialized coun- 
tries for the floating rate period after the second quarter of  1973 (1973/II) than 
he did for his entire 1967/II to 1979/II sample period. Caramazza et al. (1986, 
43-47)  also found that some of the major industrialized countries in the 1980s 
(January 1980 through June 1985) moved farther from real interest parity than 
they had been in the 1970s (July 1973 through December 1979).9  In the early 
1980s, the real interest rate in the United States, in particular, rose far above 
the real interest rate of its major trading partners, by any of a variety of mea- 
sures.'O If the domestic real interest rate is not tied to the foreign real interest 
rate,  then  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  a  zero  coefficient in  the  saving- 
investment regression. We discuss in a later section the factors underlying real 
interest differentials. 
8.2.2  The U.S. Saving-Investment Regression Updated 
Since 1980 the massive fiscal experiment carried out under the Reagan ad- 
ministration has been  rapidly undermining the  statistical finding of  a high 
saving-investment correlation for the case of the United States. The increase 
in the structural budget deficit, which was neither accommodated by monetary 
policy nor financed by an increase in private saving, reduced the national sav- 
ing rate by  3 percent of  GNP, relative to the  1970s. The investment rate- 
which at first, like the saving rate, fell in the 1981-82  recession-in  the late 
1980s approximately reattained its 1980 level at best.  The saving shortfall 
was made up, necessarily, by a flood of borrowing from abroad equal to more 
than 3 percent of GNP. Hence the current account deficit of  $161 billion in 
1987. By contrast, the U.S. current account balance was on average equal to 
zero in the 1970s. 
By  now,  the divergence between U.S. national saving and investment has 
been sufficiently large and long lasting to show up in longer-term regressions 
of  the Feldstein-Horioka type.  If  one seeks to isolate the degree of  capital 
mobility or crowding out for the United States in particular, and how it has 
changed over time, then time-series regression is necessary (whereas if one is 
concerned with such measures worldwide, then cross-section regressions of 
the sort performed by  Feldstein and  Horioka are better). Table 8.1 reports 
instrumental variables regressions of  investment against national saving for 
the United States from  1870 to  1987.12 Decade averages are used for each 
variable, which removes some of  the cyclical variation but gives us only 12 
observations. (Yearly data are not in any case available before 1930.) That is 
one more observation than was available in Frankel (1986, table 2.2), which 
went only through the 1970s. 
As before, the coefficient is statistically greater than zero and is not statis- 
tically different from one, suggesting a high degree of crowding out (or a low 232  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.1  The “Feldstein-Horioka  Coefficient” by Decades, 1869-1987; 
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against 
National Saving (as  shares of GNP) 
Time Trend  Durbin-Watson  Autoregressive 
Constant  Coefficient  in Coefficient  Statistic  Parameter  R2 
1.  ,411  ,976  1.45  ,913 
2.  3.324  ,785  .46  .97 
3.  3.291  ,854  -.011  .73  .92 
4.  1.061  ,924  .001  .03  .96 
(1.340)  (.086) 
(1.842)  (.118)  (.33) 
(6.176)  (.279)  (.21) 
(  1.507 j  (.093)  (.005)  (.08) 
Nore: Instrumental variables are dependency ratio and military expenditurelGNP. 
YGNP  CA/GNP 
Percent of  GNP  YSlGJP. 
Fig. 8.1 
investment, and current account: 10-year averages 
U.S. national saving (private saving plus government budget surplus), 
degree of  capital mobility, in Feldstein and Horioka’s terms). But the point 
estimate of  the coefficient (when correcting for possible serial correlation) 
drops from .91 in the earlier study to .79. We can allow for a time trend in the 
coefficient; it drops from plus .01 a year in the earlier study to minus .01 a 
year  (or  plus  ,001,  when  correcting  for  serial correlation)  in  the  longer 233  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s 
sample. Thus the additional years  1980-87  do show up  as anticipated: as 
exhibiting a lower U.S. degree of crowding out, even if  the change is small. 
(The trend is not statistically significant, but this is not surprising given the 
small number of observations  .) 
A date set that begins later would seem more promising than the 12 decade 
averages. Table 8.2 reports regressions for yearly data beginning in  1930. 
Much of  the variation in the yearly data is cyclical, so table 8.3 uses saving 
and investment rates that have been cyclically adjusted, for a sample period 
Table 8.2  The “Feldstein-Horioka Coefficient” by Years, 1929-87; 
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against 
National Saving (as  shares of GNP), Comparing Regressions Before 
and After 1980 
Durbin-Watson  Autoregressive 
Constant  Coefficient  Statistic  Parameter  R2 
1929-87  2.99 
(38) 
1930-87  4.85 
(2.61) 
1929-79  1.89 
(.61) 
1930-79  2.00 
(.66) 
1980-87  13.73 
(3.85) 
1981-87  -  .36 
(36) 
.64  .94 
.77  .89 
(.W 
1.31  .97 
.38  .95 
2.09 
-  .37  .OO 
Not Converged 
Table 8.3  The “Feldstein-Horioka Coefficient”  by Years, 1955-87: 
Instrumental Variables Regression of U.S. Investment against 
National Saving (as  shares of GNP and cyclically adjusted) 
Durbin-Watson  Autoregressive 
Constant  Coefficient  Statistic  Parameter  R= 
1929-87 
193@-87 
1929-79  -  .68 
(.  17) 
1930-79  -  .57 
(.18) 
1980-87  .39 
(.36) 
1981-87  .58 
(.37) 
.96  .25 
.50  .42 
1.61  .73 
(.W 
.35  .70 
2.46  .30 
(.20) 
-  .I3  .34 
~41) 
Constant term is automaticallly zero because cyclically adjusted rates are residuals from a 1955- 
87 regression against the GNP gap. 234  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
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Fig. 8.2  U.S. national saving, investment, and current account 
that begins in 1955. The cyclical adjustment of each is accomplished by  first 
regressing it on the GNP gap, defined as the percentage deviation from the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s “middle expansion trend” of GNP, and taking 
the residuals. 
In  previous work with  a sample period of  1956-84,  the coefficient in a 
regression of cyclically adjusted saving and investment rates was estimated at 
.80, statistically indistinguishable from  1 (Frankel 1986, 43-44).  But now 
the coefficient has dropped essentially to zero,  suggesting a zero degree of 
crowding out, or a zero degree of  “saving retention” (or, in the Feldstein- 
Horioka terminology, “perfect capital mobility”). This finding is the result of 
the addition to the sample of  another three years of  record current account 
deficits, 1985-87,  a period also in which the cyclically adjusted national sav- 
ing rate was historically low.  When the equation is estimated with an allow- 
ance for a time trend in the coefficient, the trend is negative (though statisti- 
cally insignificant), whereas the earlier sample that stopped in 1984 showed a 
time trend that was positive (and insignificant). 
To  verify that the 1980s experience is indeed the source of the precipitous 
fall in the saving-investment ~oefficient,’~  the sample period is split at 1980. 
For the period 1955-79,  not only is the coefficient statistically indistinguish- 
able from one, but the point estimate is slightly over one.14 It is clearly the 
unprecedented developments of  the present decade that have overturned the 
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States. It is likely that financial liberalization in Japan, the United Kingdom, 
and other countries, and continued innovation in the Euromarkets (and per- 
haps the 1984 repeal of the U.S. withholding tax on borrowing from abroad), 
have resulted in a higher degree of capital mobility and thereby facilitated the 
record flow of capital to the United States in the 1980s. But the magnitude of 
the inflow is in the first instance attributable to the unprecedented magnitude 
of the decline in national saving.I5 
8.3  Differentials in Expected Rates of Return, and Expected 
Real Depreciation 
If the goal is to measure the degree of integration of capital markets, rather 
than the degree to which decreases in national saving have crowded out in- 
vestment, then it is better to look at differences in rates of return across coun- 
tries rather than looking at saving-investment correlations.  l6  But measuring 
real interest differentials will not do the trick. An international investor, when 
deciding what country’s assets to buy, will not compare the interest rates in 
different countries each expressed in terms of expected purchasing power over 
that country’s goods. When he or she thinks to evaluate assets in terms of 
purchasing power, all assets will be evaluated in terms of  the same basket, the 
one consumed by  that  particular investor. The expected inflation rate then 
drops out of differentials in expected rates of return among assets. 
The differential in expected rates of return on two countries’ bonds is the 
uncovered interest differential, the nominal interest differential minus the ex- 
pected change in the exchange rate:  i -  i* - (Ase). If  asset demands are 
highly sensitive to expected rates of return, then the differential will be zero, 
which gives us uncovered interest parity: 
(3)  j-j*-  (Ase) = 0. 
To distinguish this parity condition, which is criterion 3 above, from the other 
definitions, it has often been designated “perfect substitutability”: not only is 
there little in the manner of transactions costs or government-imposed con- 
trols to separate national markets, but also domestic currency and foreign cur- 
rency bonds are perfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios. 
Just as criterion 1 is considerably stronger than criterion 2, so is criterion 2 
considerably stronger than criterion 3. For real interest parity to hold,  one 
must have not only uncovered interest parity, but an additional condition as 
well, which is sometimes called ex ante relative purchasing power parity: 
(2‘)  Ase = Ape -  Ape*. 
Equation (2’) and equation (3) together imply equation (2). If goods markets 
are perfectly integrated, meaning not only that there is little in the manner of 
transportation costs or government-imposed barriers to separate national mar- 
kets, but also that domestic and foreign goods are perfect substitutes in con- 236  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
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1860  1880  1900  1920  1940  1960  1980  2(  10 
Fig. 8.3  Dollar/pound real exchange rate, 1869-1987,  with period average 
sumers’ utility  functions,  then purchasing power  parity  holds.  Purchasing 
power parity (PPP) in turn implies (2’). But as is by now well known, goods 
markets are not in fact perfectly integrated. Because of the possibility of ex- 
pected real depreciation, real interest parity can fail even if criterion (3) holds 
perfectly. The remainder of this section considers the question of whether ex 
ante relative PPP, equation (2‘),  holds. 
The enormous real appreciation of the dollar in the early 1980s and subse- 
quent real depreciation have by  now convinced the remaining doubters, but 
abundant  statistical  evidence  against  PPP  was  there  all  along.  Krugman 
(1978, 406), for example, computed for the floating rate period July  1973 
through  December  1976 standard deviations of  the  (logarithmic) real  ex- 
change rate equal to 6.0 percent for the pound/dollar rate and 8.4  percent for 
the mark/dollar rate. He also computed serial correlation coefficients for PPP 
deviations of  .897 and .854, respectively, on a monthly basis, equal to .271 
and .150 on an  annual basis. The serial correlation coefficient is of  interest 
because it is equal to one minus the speed of adjustment to PPP. It may be best 
not to rely exclusively on the standard deviation of the real exchange rate as a 
summary statistic for the degree of integration of goods markets, because it in 
part reflects the magnitude of monetary disturbances during the period. 
Table 8.4 shows updated annual statistics on the real exchange rate between 
the United States and Great Britain. During the floating rate period  1973- 
87, though there is no significant time trend, there is a large standard error 
of 15.6 percent. The serial correlation in the deviations from PPP is estimated 
at  ,687,  with  a  standard  error  of  .208.  (The  equation  estimated  is 
[er,  + , -  er, +  where er is the real exchange rate, 
er is the long-run equilibrium level, alternatively estimated as the  sample 
mean or a time trend, and AR  is the autoregressive coefficient.) This means 
- 
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Table 8.4  Purchasing Power Parity between the United States and the United 
Kingdom 
Statistics on Percentage 
Deviation from Mean  1973-87  1945-72  1945-87  1869-1987 
Mean absolute deviation  ,120  ,074  .  I10  .093 
Standard deviation  ,156  ,091  ,156  ,121 
Time trend  ,001  -  .001  .006*  -  .001* 
(.010)  (.ow  (.001) 
Regressions of Real 
Exchange Rate 
Autoregressions 
Deviation from mean  .687*  .722*  .830*  .844* 
(.208)  (.130)  (.092)  (.050) 
Deviation from trend  .688*  .730*  .741*  .838* 
(  ,208)  (.131)  (.101)  (.052) 
Regression Against 
Nominal Exchange Rate 
Coefficient*  2.516*  1.220*  1.687*  .916* 
(.417)  (.103)  (.186)  (.093) 
Autocorrelation  .959*  .989*  ,992  .988* 
Coefficient  (.054)  (.015)  (.011)  (.014) 
Note:  Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
"With constant term and correction for autocorrelation. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
that the estimated speed of  adjustment to PPP is .313 per year, and that one 
can easily reject the hypothesis of instantaneous adjustment. 
From the ashes of absolute PPP, a phoenix has risen. In response to findings 
such as those reported here, some authors have swung from one extreme, the 
proposition that the tendency of the real exchange rate to return to a constant 
is complete and instantaneous, to the opposite extreme that there is no such 
tendency at all. The hypothesis that the real exchange rate follows a random 
walk is just as good as the hypothesis of  absolute PPP for implying ex ante 
relative PPP. But there is even less of an a priori case why PPP should hold in 
rate-of-change form than in the level form. 
Even though ex ante relative PPP has little basis in theory, it does appear to 
have some empirical support. Typically, the estimated speeds of  adjustment 
during the floating rate period, .31 in table 8.4 (1973-87),  while not so low 
as to be implausible as point estimates, are nevertheless so low that one statis- 
tically cannot reject the hypothesis that they  are zero.  In other words one 
cannot reject the random walk hypothesis that the autoregression coefficient 
is 1.0. 238  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
A 95 percent confidence interval on the autoregressive coefficient covers 
the range 0.27-1.10.  If  the null hypothesis is an autoregressive coefficient of 
1  .O, one cannot legitimately use the standard t-test derived from a regression 
where the right-hand-side variable is the level of the real exchange rate, be- 
cause under the null hypothesis the variance is infinite. (This does not invali- 
date the t-test just reported of  the null hypothesis that the tendency to return 
to PPP was  100 percent, that is, AR  = 0). There are a number of  ways of 
dealing with this nonstationarity problem. Here one simply applies the cor- 
rected Dickey-Fuller 95 percent significance level, 3.00. The .31 estimate for 
the floating-rate period is insignificantly different from zero. 
This failure to reject a random walk in the real exchange rate is the same 
result found by  Roll (1979), Frenkel (1981, 699), Adler and Lehman (1983), 
Darby  (1981), Mishkin (1984a,  1351-53)  and Pigott and Sweeney (1985). 
Most of  these studies used monthly data. On the one hand, the greater abun- 
dance of data reduces the standard error of the estimate but, on the other hand, 
one is no longer testing whether AR  = .69 is different from 1  .O,  but rather 
whether .97( = AR1’I2)  is different from 1 .O, so that it may not be much easier 
to reject. Another problem is that one does not know that the nature of the true 
autoregressive process is truly first order on a monthly (or continuous-time) 
basis. In any case, the monthly date in the studies cited were generally not 
powerful enough to reject the random walk.’* 
A more promising alternative is to choose a longer time sample to get a 
more powerful estimate. Table 8.4 also reports statistics for the entire postwar 
period, 1945-87.  PPP held better for the Bretton Woods years than it did after 
1973, as measured either by the mean absolute deviation and standard devia- 
tion of the real exchange rate or by the ability to reject the hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation. But, despite the longer time sample, one is only at the bor- 
derline of  being able to reject the random walk. The 95 percent confidence 
interval for AR runs from 0.64 to 1.02 (or 0.52 to 0.96, when allowing for a 
trend in the long-run equilibrium), and the t-ratio of  1.85 (or 2.56, when al- 
lowing for the trend) falls short of the Dickey-Fuller 95 percent significance 
level of 2.93. 
The asymptotic standard error of  an estimate of AR  is approximately the 
square root of (1 -  AR2)/N.  So if the true speed of adjustment is on the order 
of  30 percent a year (AR = .7), a simple calculation suggests that we might 
require at least 49 years of data (2.932[  1 - .72]/[1 - .712 = 48.6) to be able 
to reject the null hypothesis of AR  = 1. It is not very surprising that 43 years 
of  data is not enough, much less the 15 years of data used in most studies.Ig 
Econometricians consider the asymptotic standard error on which this calcu- 
lation is based to be a bad approximation in small samples. But the correct 
power calculation suggests that,  if anything, the sample required to reject a 
random walk would be even larger than 49.20 
The last column of  table 8.4 presents an entire  119 years of  U.S.-U.K. 
data. With this long a time sample, the standard error is reduced considerably. 239  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the  1980s 
The rejection of no serial correlation in the real exchange rate is even stronger 
than in the shorter time samples. More important, one is finally able to detect 
a statistically significant tendency for the real exchange rate to regress to PPP, 
at a rate of  16 percent a year. The confidence interval for AR  runs from 0.75 
to 0.94, safely less than unity, and the t-ratio of  3.12 exceeds the Dickey- 
Fuller significance level of 2.89.21 
The  last row  of  the  table reports  regressions of  the real exchange rate 
against the nominal exchange rate. The coefficient is highly significant for all 
time samples. The figures suggest that changes in the nominal rate (due, for 
example, to devaluations under fixed exchange rates or monetary disturbances 
under floating exchange rates) in  the presence of  sticky goods prices cause 
transitory changes in the real exchange rate. Such results specifically rule out 
the possibility, which has been occasionally suggested in the past, that appar- 
ent deviations from PPP might be attributed to (random) measurement errors 
in the price data. 
The motivation for looking at PPP in this section has been to obtain insight 
into the expected rate of real depreciation, because that is the variable that can 
give rise to real interest differentials even in the presence of uncovered interest 
parity.22  In rejecting the random walk description of the real exchange rate, 
one has rejected the claim that the rationally expected rate of real depreciation 
is zero.23  To take an example, in  1983-84,  when the dollar had appreciated 
some 30 percent above its PPP value, survey data show expected future real 
depreciation of 4.3  percent per year. It is thus not difficult to explain the exis- 
tence of the U.S. real interest differential, even without appealing to any sort 
of risk premium. There is little excuse for authors such as Koraczyk (1985, 
350) and Darby (1985, 420) ruling out the possibility of expected real depre- 
ciation a priori and thereby concluding that real interest differentials necessar- 
ily constitute risk premiums. 
If  the failure of  ex ante relative purchasing power parity could, in itself, 
explain the failure of real interest parity, then it could also, by  itself, explain 
the failure of  saving and investment to be uncorrelated. In the recent U.S. 
context, a fall in national saving could cause an increase in the real interest 
differential and therefore a fall in investment, even if  financial markets are 
perfectly integrated and even if the fall in saving is truly exogenous, provided 
the real interest differential is associated with expected real depreciation of the 
dollar. 
Demonstrating that the failure of ex ante relative purchasing power parity 
is capable  of  producing a correlation between saving and investment is, of 
course, not the same thing as asserting that this in fact is the explanation for 
the observed correlation. There are plenty of  other competing explanations 
that have been proposed. But some support for the idea that the existence of 
expected real depreciation is key to the observed correlation comes from Car- 
dia (1988). She simulates saving and investment rates in a sequence of models 
featuring shocks to fiscal spending, money growth, and productivity, in order 240  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
to see which models are capable, for empirically-relevant magnitudes of  the 
parameters, of producing saving-investment correlations as high as those ob- 
served. To  get at some of the explanations that have been most prominently 
proposed, she constructs models both with and without PPP, both with and 
without endogenous response of  fiscal policy to current account imbalances, 
and both with and without the small-country assumption. The finding is that 
the model that  allows for  deviations from  PPP is able to  explain saving- 
investment correlations as high as one, while the various models that impose 
PPP are generally not able to do 
Further empirical support for the idea that the Feldstein-Horioka results 
may in fact be due to imperfect integration of goods markets, rather than im- 
perfect integration of financial markets, is provided by a test by Bayoumi and 
Rose (1989).  They compute the correlation of  saving and investment across 
regions within the United Kingdom, reasoning that these regions-unlike  na- 
tions-are  highly integrated with respect to their goods markets, and find no 
positive correlation. 
8.4  A Decomposition of Real Interest Differentials for 25 Countries 
Because there are so many competing definitions of the degree of interna- 
tional capital mobility, it would be worth knowing if the sort of countries that 
register high by one criterion are also the sort that register high by the others. 
In this section we look at rates of  return in the 1980s across a sample of 25 
countries. We  begin  with  the broadest measure of  barriers to international 
capital mobility, the differential in real interest rates, defined as: 
(4)  r - r*  = (i -  Ape) -  (i*  - Ape*). 
Subsequently we will decompose the real interest differential into a com- 
ponent due to “political” or country factors and a component due to currency 
factors : 
(5)  - r*  = (i -  j*  -  fd) - (fd -  Ape + Ape*), 
where i is the domestic nominal interest rate, i*  is the foreign nominal interest 
rate, and fd is the forward discount on the domestic currency. The first term 
(i - i* -  fd)  is the covered interest differential. We  call it the political or 
country premium because it captures all barriers to integration of  financial 
markets across  national  boundaries: transactions costs,  information costs, 
capital controls, tax laws that discriminate by country of  residence, default 
risk, and risk of  future capital controls. The second term could be described 
as the real forward discount. We  call it the currency premium because it cap- 
tures differences in assets according to the currency in which they are denom- 
inated, rather than in terms of  the political jurisdiction in which they are is- 
sued. As we will see, the currency premium can in turn be decomposed into 
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The decomposition of  the real interest differential would not be possible 
without the use of data on forward exchange rates. Many previous studies 
have used forward rate data to test covered interest parity, but only for a few 
countries. The present study uses forward rate data for panel of 25 countries, 
which so far as I know is the largest set ever examined. The set of 25 includes 
countries both large and small, industrialized and developing, Atlantic and 
Pacific. The forward rate data for most of the countries come from Barclay’s 
Bank in London, via Data Resources, I~c.*~ 
8.4.1  Real Interest Differentials 
Table 8.5 reports statistics on three-month real interest differentials for the 
25 countries, in each case expressed as the local interest rate measured relative 
to the Eurodollar interest rate. For local interest rates we  use the interbank 
market rate or, where no market rate exists, the most flexibly determined in- 
terest rate available.26  We use, to begin with, the realized inflation rates during 
the ex post three-month period. Column 2 of table 8.5 reports the mean real 
interest differential during the  sample period,  September 1982 to  January 
1988. (In this  and  subsequent tables, because the ex  post  data run  three 
months behind the ex ante expectations, they go up to April 1988.) The num- 
bers are negative for a majority of countries, averaging -  1.74 across all 25, 
which reflects the high level of real dollar interest rates during this period. 
The countries are classified into five groups chosen on a priori grounds. The 
group with real interest rates the farthest below the world rate is Bahrain, 
Greece, Mexico, Portugal, and South Africa. These five (very diverse) coun- 
tries bear the burden of representing a wide class of  LDCs in  our sample. 
Altogether there are eight countries classified as LDCs that happen to have 
forward rate data available and thereby appear in our sample; three of these 
are East Asian countries that are thought to have open financial markets in the 
1980s (Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia) and so are here classified sepa- 
rately. 
One might object that the large negative real interest differentials in the 
group of five reflect administered local interest rates that are kept artificially 
low by  “financial repression.” But countries cannot maintain artificially low 
interest rates without barriers to capital outflow. These statistics reflect a low 
degree of  capital mobility precisely as we want them to. In this respect our 
group of five is typical of LDCs. A number of studies, including much larger 
LDC samples than available here, have shown the extremes to which real in- 
terest rates can go, particularly some very negative levels in the 1970s. 
As with the other measures of interest rate differentials that we will be con- 
sidering below, the mean is not always the most useful statistic. A small mean 
over a particular sample period may hide fluctuations  in both directions. Even 
if  a mean is statistically signifi~ant,~’  it is useful to know in addition the vari- 
ability of the differential. The standard deviation is reported in table 8.5, col- 
umn 4. We  also report the root mean squared error in column 5.  (This would 242  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.5  Real Interest Differentials (local minus Eurodollar; three-month rates): 
Interest Differential Less Realized Inflation Differential, September 1982 to 
January 1988 
Standard  Series  RootMean  95 
Number of  Error of  Standard  Squared  Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 









































































-  1.29 
-  .71 
-  2.72 
.46 
-  .83 
-  2.89 
.83 
.08 
-  .67 
2.19 
-  9.22 




-  2.20 
.53 
-3.42 
-  .48 
1.53 
1.01 
-  .64 
.53 
-  .21 
-  .37 
1.16 
-  .58 
1.04 
.52 





















































































































11.36 243  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s 
be  a superior measure of  how  closely the rates are tied together if, for ex- 
ample, we are worried about the possibility of a large differential that is fairly 
constant over time because of government administration of  interest rates.) 
Finally, we report in column 6 how big a band would be needed to encompass 
95 percent of the deviations from real interest parity. 
Country-group comparisons of the measures of real interest differential var- 
iability in some respects suit a priori expectations: the five closed LDCs con- 
stitute the group with the highest variability, and the five open Atlantic coun- 
tries the group with the lowest.28  But there are some results that are anomalous 
if the real interest differential is taken as a measure of financial market integra- 
tion. France, for example, had stringent capital controls in place during our 
sample period (at least until the latter part of the period) and yet appears to 
have a higher degree of capital mobility by the criterion of real interest differ- 
ential variability than Japan, which announced liberalization of its capital con- 
trols before our sample period (1979-80). One might conceivably argue that 
the Japanese liberalization must not have been genuine. But the French real 
interest differential is smaller and less variable even than those of the Nether- 
lands and Switzerland, major countries that are known to be virtually free of 
capital controls. Only Canada shows a smaller and less variable real interest 
differential than France. 
Because the realized inflation rates could not have been precisely known a 
priori, it is  necessary to project them onto contemporaneously known vari- 
ables. Three such variables were used: the forward discount, nominal interest 
differential, and  lagged  inflation differential. (The results are  reported  in 
NBER  Working Paper no. 2856, but  are omitted here to save space.) In a 
majority of cases, a statistically significant amount of the variation in the real 
interest differential turned out to be foreca~table.~~  The standard deviation of 
the projected differential gives us our final measure of variability. The results 
for the ex ante real interest differential are mostly similar to those for the ex 
post. France, for example, still shows a lower degree of variability than the 
Netherlands. 
8.4.2  Covered Interest Differentials: The Country Premium 
We  now use the Barclay’s forward rate data to decompose the real interest 
differential into one part due to country factors and another due to currency 
factors, as in equation (5). The first component, the covered interest differen- 
tial, encompasses all factors related to the political jurisdiction in which the 
asset is issued. Its size and variability measures barriers to international capi- 
tal mobility most narrowly and properly defined. 
Column 2 of table 8.6 reports the mean of the covered interest differential 
for each of our 25  countries. A good rule of thumb, when the absolute mag- 
nitude of the mean or the variability of the differential indicates the existence 
of significant barriers, is as follows: a negative differential vis-8-vis the Euro- 
currency market indicates that, to the extent that barriers exist, they are capital 244  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.6  “Country Premia” or Covered Interest Differentials (local minus 
Eurodollar; three-months  rates): Interest Differential Less Forward 
Discount, September 1982 to April 1988 
Standard  Series  Root Mean  95 
Number of  Error of  Standard  Squared  Percent 
Observations  Mean  Mean  Deviation  Error  Band 
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controls or transactions costs currently operating to discourage capital from 
flowing out of  the country. Investors would not settle for a lower return do- 
mestically if they were free to earn abroad the higher return covered to elimi- 
nate exchange risk. This is the case for all the LDCs in the sample, with the 
exception of Hong Kong, and for all of  the traditionally “closed” European 
countries, with the exceptions of Austria and Belgium (which should by now 
probably be  classified with the “open” countries). The negative differential 
that existed for the United Kingdom before Margaret Thatcher removed capi- 
tal controls in  1979 is now extremely small.30  Similarly, Canada’s differential 
is effectively zero.31 
Column 6 of table 8.6, the size of the band wide enough to encompass 95 
percent of  deviations from international covered interest parity, can be com- 
pared with the approach of Frenkel and Levich (1977). They tested a larger 
band meant to represent transactions costs between pound and dollar securi- 
ties. They found, for the case of the United Kingdom, that a smaller percent- 
age of  deviations (87.6-89.7  percent; Frenkel and  Levich 1977, 1217) fell 
within the band. This confirms that capital mobility has increased since the 
1970s. 
Germany and several other neighboring European countries (Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, Austria, and Belgium) show higher interest rates locally than 
offshore, which suggests some barriers discouraging capital injow: investors 
would not settle for a lower mark return in the Euromarket if they were free to 
get the higher return in Germany. But the magnitude is quite small, as it has 
been  observed to be ever since Germany removed most of  its controls on 
capital inflow in  1974 (Dooley and  Isard  1980; and Giavazzi and Pagano 
1985,27). 
Japan has a covered differential that by  all measures is smaller and less 
variable than those of Switzerland and Germany, let alone France and most of 
the other countries. This might come as a surprise to those accustomed to 
thinking of Japanese financial markets in terms of the large barriers to capital 
inflow that were in place in the 1970s. The liberalization of Japanese markets, 
which has been documented elsewhere, continued during our sample period.3Z 
Australia and New Zealand, while lagging well behind Japan, also show signs 
of liberalization during the course of our sample period.33 
The covered interest differential for France is much larger and more variable 
than that for the other major industrialized countries known to be free of cap- 
ital controls. This is the reverse of the finding from the criterion of real interest 
differentials in table 8.5.  It supports the value of the criterion of covered inter- 
est differentials as the proper test of financial market integration. The differ- 
ential, with its negative sign signifying controls on French capital outflows, 
has been previously studied, especially its tendency to shoot up shortly before 
devaluations of the franc.34  Our data indicate that the last major occurrence of 
this phenomenon was February 1986; since then the differential has been close 
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Similarly, the same phenomenon for Italy, which has also been previously 
studied (e.g., Giavazzi and Pagano 1985), appears to have ended after the 
February 1986 realignment. France and Italy dismantled their capital controls 
quickly enough to meet a 1990 deadline for liberalization recently set by the 
EEC Twelve.35  Of four countries that required a later deadline, Spain and Por- 
tugal have by our measures already been liberalizing (plots show that the mag- 
nitude of  the covered interest differential fell sharply in  1987 for these two 
countries), but Greece and Ireland have not. Sweden is one non-EEC Euro- 
pean  country that  appears to have moved  toward liberalization during our 
sample period, while Norway does not. All of these European countries show 
up with negative mean differentials, which implies that the remaining controls 
act to discourage capital outflow rather than inflow. For the EEC countries, 
this finding supports records of  the European Commission, which reports 
more freedom for short-term inflows than short-term outflows.36 
Registering impressively open financial markets are our three East Asian 
LDCs (which, especially in the case of Singapore, have rapidly outgrown the 
appellation “less developed”). Hong Kong and Singapore show smaller cov- 
ered differentials even than some open European countries like Germany. Ma- 
laysia’s differential has been considerably higher, particularly in  1986, but 
still compares favorably with some European countries. 
Not surprisingly, our remaining LDCs (Mexico, Greece, Portugal, Bahrain, 
and South Africa) show by far the largest and most variable covered interest 
 differential^.^' Again, the results are precisely what one would expect if  cov- 
ered interest differentials are the proper criterion for capital mobility, but the 
reverse of what the saving-investment criterion shows. 
Why does the covered differential criterion give such different answers from 
the saving-investment criterion, which shows a high degree of  saving reten- 
tion among industrialized countries? Feldstein and Horioka (1980, 315) argue 
that financial markets are less well  integrated at longer-term maturities, as 
compared to the three-month maturities used in tests of covered interest parity 
such as those reported above: “It is clear from the yields on short-term secu- 
rities in the Eurocurrency market and the forward prices of those currencies 
that liquid financial capital moves very rapidly to arbitrage such short-term 
differentials. . . . There are however reasons to be sceptical about the extent 
of such long-term arbitrage.” 
Studies of international interest parity have been restricted by a lack of for- 
ward exchange rates at horizons going out much further than one year.38  But 
even without the use of forward rate data, there are ways of  getting around the 
problem of exchange risk. Data on currency swap rates can be used in place 
of forward exchange rates to test the long-term version of interest rate parity. 
Popper (1990) finds that the swap-covered return differential on five-year U.S. 
government bonds versus Japanese bonds averaged only 1.7 basis points from 
October 3,  1985 to July  10, 1986, and  that  the differential on  seven-year 
bonds averaged only 5.3 basis points. The means mask some variation in the 247  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the  1980s 
differential. But a band of  46 basis points is large enough to encompass 95 
percent of the observations for the five-year bonds. The band is 34 basis points 
for the seven-year bonds. The means on five-year bonds for some other major 
countries are as follows: Canada 15.9, Switzerland 18.7, United Kingdom 
5 1.1, and Germany 28.4. 
The magnitude of these long-term differentials compares favorably with the 
magnitude of the short-term differentials. The implication is that Feldstein and 
Horioka are wrong in  their conjecture that there is a term-structure wedge 
separating national capital markets.39  The most relevant distinction appears to 
be, not long-term versus short-term, but rather real versus nominal. 
8.4.3  “Real Forward Discounts”: The Currency Premium 
Even for those countries that exhibit no substantial country premium, as 
reflected in covered interest parity cfd -  [i -  i*] = 0), there may still be a 
substantial  currency  premium  that  drives  real  interest  differentials 
([i -  Ape] -  [i*  - Ape*])  away from zero. If real interest differentials are 
not  arbitraged  to  zero,  then  there  is  in  turn  no  reason to  expect  saving- 
investment correlations to be zero. Table 8.7 reports the statistics for the cur- 
rency premium, as measured by the “real forward discount”: 
fd - (Ape -  Ape*). 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Austria, and Japan, for example, all 
have substantial real  forward discounts (or-more  precisely-real  forward 
premia), which constitute approximately the entirety of their real interest dif- 
ferentials. These are countries with currencies that have experienced a lot of 
exchange rate  variability, both  nominal and  real,  vis-8-vis the dollar since 
1973, and especially since  1980. As a consequence, some combination of 
exchange risk premiums and expected real depreciation-factors  pertaining 
to the currency, not to the political jurisdiction-produces  the gap in real in- 
terest rates.  For these five financially open industrialized countries, and for 
Hong Kong as well, the currency factors produce a negative real interest dif- 
ferential, while the covered interest differential (though small) is positive: the 
small regulations or frictions that remain in these countries are, if  anything, 
working to resist capital inflow (at least at the short end of the maturity spec- 
trum), not outflow as one would mistakenly conclude from the real interest 
differential criterion.  The other countries all have highly variable currency 
premiums as well.  Indeed the real forward discount (currency premium) is 
more variable than the covered interest differential (country premium) for all 
but three of our 25 countries (Greece, Mexico, and France). The last rows of 
tables 8.6 and  8.7 show that  the average variability across all countries is 
higher for the currency premium than for the country premium. 
We  can project the real forward discount on the same three variables as we 
did for the real interest differential (the forward discount, nominal interest 
differential, and lagged inflation differential) to get an ex ante measure.4o  Its 248  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.7  “Currency Premia” or Real Forward Discounts: Forward Discount Less 
Realized Inflation Differential, September 1982 to January 1988 
Standard  Series  Root Mean  95 
Number of  Error of  Standard  Squared  Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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standard deviation now shows six countries for whom the currency premium 
is less variable than the country premium (Greece, Mexico, Portugal, France, 
Italy, and Spain). But the currency premium remains the major obstacle to real 
interest parity for most countries. 
8.4.4  Further Decomposition into Exchange Risk Premium and Expected 
Real Depreciation 
Our decomposition so far has lumped two terms, the exchange risk pre- 
mium and expected real depreciation, together into the currency premium: 
fd -  Ape + Ape* = (fd - Ase) + (AS' -  Ape + Ape*). 
In this section we attempt to complete the decomposition by separating these 
two terms. To  do so requires a measure or model of expected depreciation. 
The usual approach is to use the ex post changes in the spot rate (As) as a 
measure of ex ante expectations (As'),  and to argue that under rational expec- 
tations the expectational error (e = As -  Ase) should be random (uncorre- 
lated with information currently available at time t). 
Column 2 of table 8.8 reports the mean value of cfd -  As) for each of our 
countries. Most of the means are positive, showing that the weak-dollar pe- 
riod (1985-88)  dominates over the strong-dollar period (1982-1985).4'  But 
only three currencies have mean risk premiums, of either sign, that are statis- 
tically ~ignificant.~~  Furthermore, in a majority of cases (16/25), the sign of 
the mean return differential is the opposite of the sign of the mean real interest 
differential during the same period (table 8.5, col. 2). So this measure of the 
exchange risk premium does not explain any positive part of the real interest 
differential. 
The measures of variability of cfd -  As) show up very large in columns 4, 
5,  and 6. These are measures of the variability of ex post return differentials, 
not ex ante. They tell us little about the variability of the exchange risk pre- 
mium. But the high variability of  the exchange rate does tell us two things. 
First,  it  provides an obvious explanation-low  power-why  the  first mo- 
ments might not be statistically significant. On the other hand, the existence 
of  substantial uncertainty regarding the  future  spot rate  suggests,  via  the 
theory of optimal portfolio diversification, that a nonzero exchange risk pre- 
mium must exist, to reward risk-averse investors for holding currencies that 
are perceived as risky or that are in oversupply. 
To  estimate the ex ante exchange risk premium, we can project cfd - As) 
onto our same three variables: the forward discount, interest differential, and 
inflation differential.43  The regression is statistically significant for a majority 
of currencies, as many others have found.44  The standard deviation shows the 
most variable exchange risk premiums belong to Mexico and New Zealand, 
but the United Kingdom,  Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland 
follow close behind. 
In table 8.9 we report the statistics for the other component of the currency 250  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Table 8.8  Return to Forward Exchange Speculation:  Forward Discount Less Realized 
Exchange Depreciation, September 1982 to January 1988 
~~~  ~~ 
Standard  Series  Root Mean  95 
Number of  Error of  Standard  Squared  Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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Table 8.9  Realized Exchange Depreciation Less Realized Inflation Differential, 
September 1982 to January 1988 
Standard  Series  Root Mean  95 
Number of  Error of  Standard  Squared  Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
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82.32 252  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
premium, expected real depreciation. As noted earlier, given the widely ac- 
cepted failure of  purchasing power parity on levels, there is no theoretical 
reason to expect it necessarily to hold in terms of expected rates of  change, 
the hypothesis sometimes known as ex ante relative purchasing power parity. 
Table 8.9 reports the statistics for ex post real depreciation. The means in 
column 2 are negative, indicating real appreciation of the currency against the 
dollar, for all European countries and for most others as well. The only five 
exceptions, countries that experienced real  depreciation against the dollar, 
were our three East Asian developing countries, Australia, and Bahrain. This 
last was the only one, of either sign, that was statistically significant. 
We  already know, from the results reported above for the 119 years of U.S.- 
U.K. data, that we cannot expect to reject ex ante relative PPP on just a few 
years of data: new disturbances to the real exchange rate are so large that one 
needs a much longer time sample to find evidence of  systematic movement. 
But the signs of the mean real depreciations are usually the same as the signs 
of  the mean real interest differentials in Table 8.5 (20/25), suggesting a high 
correlation  of  the  real  interest differential and  expected  real  depreciation 
across countries.45 
To  estimate ex ante real depreciation, we project ex post real depreciation, 
again, on the same three contemporaneous variables.46  The standard devia- 
tions for the various currencies are quite similar to those for the projected 
exchange risk p~emium.~’  In most cases (18/25) the projected exchange risk 
premium is slightly more variable than projected real depreciation. 
8.5  Conclusion 
We can sum up with four conclusions. 
1. Capital controls and other barriers to the movement of  capital across 
national borders remained for such countries as the United Kingdom and Ja- 
pan as recently as 1979, and France and Italy as recently as 1986. But a con- 
tinuing worldwide trend of integration of  financial markets in the 1980s had 
all  but  eliminated short-term  interest differentials for major industrialized 
countries by 1988. 
2.  Only the country premium  has been  eliminated; this means that  only 
covered interest differentials are small. Real and nominal exchange rate vari- 
ability remain, and indeed were larger in the 1980s than in the 1970~.~~  The 
result is that a currency premium remains, consisting of an exchange risk pre- 
mium plus expected real currency depreciation. This means that, even with 
the equalization of  covered interest rates,  large differentials in real interest 
rates remain. 
3. The United States in the 1980s began to borrow on such a massive scale 
internationally that the traditional “Feldstein-Horioka” finding of a near-unit 
correlation between national saving and investment has ‘broken down. The 253  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s 
process of liberalization in Japan and other major countries was probably one 
factor behind this massive flow of capital to the United States. 
4.  In addition to the gaps that distinguish covered interest parity from real 
interest parity, there is a further gap that separates real interest parity from the 
proposition that changes in national saving do not crowd out investment be- 
cause they are readily financed by borrowing from abroad. Bonds are not per- 
fect substitutes for equities, and equities are not perfect substitutes for plant 
and equipment. Thus at each stage, there are good reasons to think that short- 
falls in  national saving continue to be capable of  crowding out investment, 
even if to a smaller extent than before 1980. 
Notes 
1.  Despite the increased attention to inward foreign direct investment in the United 
States in recent years, it continues to be a smaller component of the capital inflow than 
portfolio investment. As of the end of 1987, foreign direct investment accounted for 
only 17 percent of the total stock of foreign-held assets in the United States. 
2.  There were relatively large differentials separating U.S. interest rates from the 
Eurodollar rates; at the long-term end of the spectrum, well-known U.S. corporations 
could borrow more cheaply in the Euromarket than domestically. These differentials 
fell steadily toward zero between 1982 and 1986, probably as the outcome of innova- 
tion that occurred in the Euromarkets-partly  in response to these differentials-mak- 
ing it easier for U.S. corporations to borrow there. Much of this innovation went under 
the name of  securitization.  See Frankel (1988a) for documentation and further refer- 
ences. (It appears that the securitization trend suffered a setback in 1987 and 1988, in 
part associated with the October 1987 stockmarket crash; it is now said to be slightly 
more costly for U.S. corporations to issue bonds in the Euromarket than domestically. 
It remains to be seen whether this reversal of the trend toward perfect integration is 
serious or lasting.) 
3.  Even if  this relationship does not break down in the future under pressure from 
fears of international creditors that U. S.  indebtedness is becoming excessive. 
4.  There is a fifth possible-yet  more narrowly defined-criterion  for the degree of 
integration of financial markets: the size of transactions costs as measured directly by 
the bid-ask  spread in, for example,  the foreign exchange market.  Surprisingly, the 
covered interest differential does not appear to be statistically related to the bid-ask 
spread (MacArthur 1988). 
5.  Obstfeld (1986) and Summers (1988) argue that the saving-investment correla- 
tion may be due to the common influence of growth rates. 
6.  Obstfeld (1986,  1989) makes the large-country point in  a time-series context, 
where it properly belongs.  But even in  a time-series regression for a single country 
such as the United States, one can correct for the large-country problem by expressing 
saving and investment rates as deviations from the rest-of-world rates of saving and 
investment,  respectively.  Under the null hypothesis,  an exogenous  fall in the  U.S. 
saving rate may drive up the world real interest rate and crowd out investment, but 
there is no evident reason for the crowding-out to be reflected in U.S. investment to 
any greater extent than in rest-of-the-world  investment. In Frankel (1986, 44-45),  I 254  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
found that the close correspondence between U.S. saving and investment for 1970-85 
remains, even with this adjustment. 
7.  Obstfeld (1986a) finds that the coefficient fell after 1973, in time-series correla- 
tions for most of his countries, but Obstfeld (1989) finds that it has risen over time 
(1967-84  vs. 1956-66),  with the United States showing the highest correlation of any. 
8. In a U.S. time-series context, Frankel (1986) used two instrumental variables: 
the fraction of the population over 65 years of age and the ratio of military expenditure 
to GNP. The former is considered a determinant of  private saving and the latter of 
public saving, and both have some claim to exogeneity. In the context of cross-sections 
of developing and industrialized countries, Dooley, Frankel,  and Mathieson  (1987) 
used the dependency ratio and, again, the military expenditure variable. 
9.  Other  studies that reject  real  interest parity for major industrialized countries 
include Mishkin  (1984a,  1984b), Cumby  and Obstfeld  (1984),  Mark  (1985),  and 
Cumby and Mishkin (1986). Click (1987) examines real interest differentials for six 
Pacific Basin countries vis-l-vis the United States. 
10.  The 10-year real interest differential vis-his  a weighted average of G-5 coun- 
tries was about 3 percent in 1984, whether expected inflation is measured by a distrib- 
uted lag, by OECD forecasts, or by Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) forecasts. In 1980, by 
contrast, the differential was about -  2 percent. Frankel (1986, 35-36). 
11. Gross investment was 16.0 percent of GNP in  1980, which was itself consid- 
ered a low number (down 0.5 percent from 1971-80). 
12. The instrumental  variables used are the dependency ratio  (the sum of  those 
older than 64  and those younger than 21, divided by the working-age population in 
between), which is a determinant of  private saving, and military expenditure as a share 
of GNP, which is a determinant of the federal budget deficit. A data appendix is avail- 
able for details on these and the other variables. 
13. There are two other potential sources of differences from the results in Frankel 
(1986): the Commerce Department released revised national accounts data for the en- 
tire period in 1986, and we now use the dependency ratio as the demographic instru- 
mental variable in place of the ratio of the over-65 to the over-20 population. But the 
years 1985-87  are indeed the source of  the fall in the coefficient; when these three 
years are omitted the coefficient is over 1 (as when the 1980s are omitted in table 8.3). 
14. If the  1956-87  sample is split at 1974, when the United States and Germany 
removed capital controls, rather than at 1979, there is still a precipitous decline in the 
cyclically adjusted saving-investment coefficient over time: from .87 (statistically, no 
difference from 1) to .31 (borderline difference from 0). (See table 3a in the working 
paper version.) If the 1930-87  sample is split at 1958, when many European countries 
restored currency convertibility, there is a small increase in the coefficient over time: 
from 33  (statistically different from 1) to 1.14 (no difference from 1). (See table 2a in 
the working paper version.) But this is no doubt because the saving and investment 
rates are not cyclically adjusted for this period (the BEA series is not available back to 
1930). Only when expressed on a cyclically adjusted basis is the U.S. national saving 
rate of 1985-1987 especially low. 
15.  Feldstein  and  Bacchetta  (in  this volume)  find a  similar drop in  the  saving- 
investment  coefficient in  the  1980s, for  a cross-section  of  industrialized  countries 
(though they do not use instrumental variables, and are thus liable to the econometric 
criticisms that others have raised concerning the endogeneity of national saving). 
16. Measuring barriers to integration by differences in rates of return has the prob- 
lem that a given degree of integration can appear smaller or larger depending on the 
disturbances to saving (or to other variables) during the sample period in question. For 
example, the greater degree of variability in the U.S. real interest differential in the 
1980s, as compared to the 1970s or 1960s, could be attributed to the greater swings in 
variables such as the structural budget deficit, rather than to a lower degree of capital 255  Quantifying International Capital Mobility in the 1980s 
mobility. (In any case, the degree of variability in covered interest differentials is very 
low in the 1980s, as we will see below.) All we can say for sure is that if the barriers to 
integration are essentially zero (the degree of  capital mobility is essentially perfect), 
then differentials in rates of return should be essentially zero. 
17. For example, Krugman  (1978) found that the standard deviation for the real 
mark/dollar exchange rate during the German hyperinflation, February  1920 through 
December  1923, was much larger (20.8 percent) than during the  1970s, even though 
the serial correlation was no higher (.765). 
18.  Cumby and Obstfeld (1984, 146) used a @statistic to test for higher-order serial 
correlation in monthly real exchange rate changes and found none. However they also 
found that expected inflation differentials were unrelated to expected exchange rate 
changes, rejecting the random walk characterization of the real exchange rate.  Hui- 
zinga (1986) was also able to reject the random walk in some cases. 
19.  As already noted, an AR coefficient of .7 on a yearly basis corresponds to an AR 
of  .97 on  a  monthly  basis  (.9712 = .70). Thus  it might  take  564 months  of  data 
(2.932[1 - .972]/[1 - .9712 = 563.7) to be  able  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of 
AR  = 1. This is 47 years, very little gain in efficiency over the test on yearly data. 
Summers (1986) demonstrates the low power of random walk tests in the context of 
stock market prices. 
20.  DeJong, Nankervis, Savin, and Whiteman (1988, table 2) offer power tables for 
the Dickey-Fuller test that show that when the true AR  parameter is .8, even a sample 
size of  100 is sufficient to reject a random walk only about 65 percent of the time. 
21.  As the sample period covers a number of changes in exchange rate regime, it 
would be desirable  to allow for shifts in the coefficient (and in the variance of  the 
disturbance term). But many of the proponents of a random walk in the real exchange 
rate claim it as evidence in favor of an “equilibrium” hypothesis, under which fluctua- 
tions in the real exchange rate are caused only by real, as opposed to monetary, factors. 
Under this null hypothesis, changes in regime should not matter for the real exchange 
rate. Thus our statistical test is a valid rejection of the null hypothesis, even though it 
lumps together all the 119 years of observations. 
22.  Sticky goods prices are only one of a number of possible sources of deviations 
from ex ante relative PPP. Another is the existence of the prices of nontraded goods in 
the relevant price index. Dornbusch (1983) shows how movement in the relative price 
of  nontraded goods affects the real interest rate, saving, and borrowing from abroad, 
while Engel and Kletzer (1989) show specifically how such movement can give rise to 
the Feldstein-Horioka finding. Bovenberg (1989) too shows how imperfect substituta- 
bility of goods can give rise to the finding. 
23.  The rationally expected rate of real depreciation estimated from a specific time- 
series process is not necessarily the same as the actual expectation of real depreciation 
held by investors. Frankel (1986,58-59)  used survey data on expectations of exchange 
rate changes (collected by the Economist-affiliated Financial Report) and forecasts of 
price level changes (by DRI) to compute a direct measure of expected real depreciation 
for the dollar against five currencies. The numbers showed an expectation that the real 
exchange rate tends to regress back toward PPP at a statistically significant rate of 8- 
12 percent a year. (The expected speed of nominal depreciation back toward PPP is 
estimated  more  sharply at  12-16  percent a year in Frankel and Froot  1987). For a 
thorough rejection of the view that investors’ expected exchange rate changes are zero, 
see Froot and Frankel 1989.) 
24.  Obstfeld (1986a) shows, in a life-cycle model of saving with actual OECD data 
on the functional distribution of income and on population growth, that the coefficient 
in an investment regression can be similar to those estimated by Feldstein and Horioka. 
(Similar claims based  on models of intertemporal optimization  are made by  Ghosh 
1988; Roubini  1988; Tesar 1988; and Leiderman and Rain 1989.) But Feldstein and 256  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Bacchetta (1989) argue that the growth rate is not in fact responsible for the observed 
coefficient. 
25.  Some of these data were also analyzed in Frankel and MacArthur (1988). Some 
forward rate observations for Italy, Austria, and Belgium in the Barclay’s data looked 
suspicious. In addition, Barclay’s does not quote a rate for Portugal.  For this study, 
forward exchange rates for Italy and Belgium are taken from the Bank of  America 
(also obtained via DRI) and for Austria and Portugal from the Financial Times. The 
Barclay’s data for Ireland also appear suspect (1986-88). 
26.  The data appendix to NBER Working Paper no. 2309 gives details. 
27.  The standard errors for individual country means are usable,  indeed are con- 
servative, despite the use of overlapping observations, because they are calculated as if 
there were T/3  observations rather than the actual T observations used. 
28.  Saving-investment regressions,  by  contrast,  show the counterintuitive result: 
coefficients for LDCs that are lower (suggesting higher capital mobility, in Feldstein 
and Horioka’s terms) than for industrialized countries.  See Fieleke (1982), Dooley, 
Frankel and Mathieson (1987), and Summers (1988). 
29.  It is possible that, for some countries, seasonal variation constitutes one fore- 
castable component. 
30. The British liberalization of  1979 is explained and analyzed in Artis and Taylor 
(1989). 
31.  As shown, e.g., by Boothe, et al. (1985, 112). 
32.  For example, Otani (1983) and Frankel (1984). 
33.  The frequently large negative covered differential that had been observed for 
34.  Claassen and Wyplosz  (1982), Giavazzi and Pagano (1985,  27-28),  Frankel 
35.  “Capitalism,” The Economist (21 May, 1988): 95. 
36.  For France, Italy, Ireland, Spain, and Greece (as reported in World Financial 
Markets, 9 September 1988, 5). Denmark’s covered differential remains quite high in 
our sample. The country has been reported to have no capital controls left (see Econo- 
mist article in n. 39,  but this evidently applies only to securities: the European Com- 
mission reports that deposits and other short-term transactions remain subject to autho- 
rization in Denmark as of 1988. 
37.  Bahrain shows a smaller differential than the others, and even than some of the 
European countries with controls, like Spain and Ireland. (It should be noted that the 
forward  rate  quoted  by  Barclay’s applies  to the  Saudi  riyal;  we  match it up  with 
the Bahraini interest rate because no local interest rate is available for Saudi Arabia and 
the two countries are said to be closely tied financially. The riyal is classified by  the 
IMF under the same exchange rate arrangement as Bahrain’s currency, the dinar, which 
would suggest that the same forward rate could be applied to both.  But the riyal ex- 
change rate does in fact vary somewhat, so that our measured covered interest differ- 
ential is not entirely legitimate.) 
38.  Taylor (1988) is one of  the most recent of many  studies of covered interest 
parity within the London Euromarket. Such studies do not get at the degree of financial 
market integration  across national  boundaries.  When  authors find deviations from 
covered interest parity in such data (e.g., Mishkin 1984a, 1350), it is often due to low 
quality of the data, e.g., inexact timing. With high-quality data, Taylor finds that cov- 
ered interest parity held extremely well in  1985, that it held less well in the  1970s, 
particularly during “turbulent” periods, that the differential had mostly vanished by 
1979, and that the differentials that do exist are slightly larger at the longer-term than 
shorter-term maturities. But, like other studies, Taylor has no data on maturities longer 
than one year. 
39.  It is still quite likely, however, that there is a wedge in each country separating 
Australia up to mid-1983 (see, e.g., Argy 1987) largely vanished thereafter. 
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the long-term interest rate from the after-tax cost of capital facing firms. Such a wedge 
could be due either to the corporate income tax system or to imperfect substitutability 
between bonds and capital. Hatsopoulos, Krugman, and Summers (1988) argue that 
the cost of capital facing U.S. corporation is higher than that facing Japanese corpora- 
tions, even when real interest rates are equal, because U.S. companies rely more heav- 
ily on equity financing, which is more expensive than debt financing. See also papers 
in Feldstein (1987). 
40.  The results are reported in NBER Working Paper no. 2856, but are omitted here 
to save space. 
41. The five exceptions, currencies that depreciated against the dollar at a rate more 
rapid than predicted by the forward discount, were the Hong Kong dollar, Malaysian 
ringgit, Singapore dollar, Saudi Arabian riyal, and South African rand. 
42.  The currencies are the Saudi Arabian riyal, and two that appreciated strongly 
against the dollar relative to the forward rate: the Japanese yen and the Portuguese 
escudo. 
43. Again, the results are reported in a working paper but are omitted here. 
44.  Many  others  have  found  a  highly  significant  predictable  component  of 
cfd -  Asc),  often when regressing against fd, and particularly in sample. It is possible 
that such findings are not due to a time-varying premium, as the rational expectations 
approach would have it, but rather to a time-varying model of  spot rate determination 
(together with insufficiently long  sample periods),  and learning  by  investors.  Such 
speculations go outside the scope of this paper. (See Frankel and Froot 1990; and Froot 
and Frankel 1989.) 
45. Columns (4-6)  show very high variability in real depreciation, but again this 
tells us little about the variation of ex ante expected depreciation, beyond the observa- 
tion that the high level of  variability implies low power in our tests of ex ante relative 
purchasing power parity. 
46.  Once again, the results are reported in a working paper, but are omitted here. 
47.  It seems that in both cases an apparently predictable component of the spot rate 
changes constitutes  most  of  the  variation  (as opposed  to variation  in  the  forward 
discount  or  inflation  differential,  respectively):  the  significant  coefficients  on  the 
forward  discount,  interest  differential,  and  ex  post  inflation  differential  when 
(As - Ap -  Ap*) is the dependent variable are always of  opposite sign and similar 
magnitude as the coefficients when (fd -  ,As)  is the dependent variable. 
48. One view is that the high degree of integration of financial markets is one of the 
causes of the high degree of  volatility of exchange rates. The issue is discussed, and 
further references given, in Frankel (1988b). 
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Comment  Maurice Obstfeld 
This paper covers a broad area in its attempt to define and measure the real- 
world counterpart of  a concept central to open-economy economic models, 
capital mobility. At  the simplest level, one might say that capital is freely 
mobile between two regions when at least some residents of each are free to 
engage in  cross-border asset trades.  The potential  for such trades should 
equalize the prices residents of the two regions are willing to pay for identical 
assets; but in the real world this equalization need not occur. Even within a 
country, for example, investors in different marginal income tax brackets may 
place differing values on the same asset. While such discrepancies certainly 
imply deviations from Pareto optimality, they may have little to do with the 
concept of capital mobility relevant for assessing, say, the impact of New York 
Fed open-market operations on California’s money supply. Nor does the ab- 
sence of  asset-valuation discrepancies imply that physical capital will always 
generate the same marginal value product throughout the world. 
Quantifying Capital Mobility in an Idealized Economy 
Despite the questionable policy relevance of defining capital mobility in 
terms of an asset-valuation  criterion, it is useful to start out by considering an 
idealized world, free of government interventions, in which contracts contin- 
gent on any state of nature can be written and costlessly enforced. Following 
Arrow and Debreu, one might define an asset as follows. Let there be C com- 
modities and monies, L locations, and S states of nature. Then an asset is an 
infinite sequence of  three-dimensional arrays (P(K,  A, a;  t)}-where  t runs 
from tomorrow to the infinite future-in  which P(K, A, a; t) specifies the 
payoff  K of a particular commodity or money to be made in location X in state 
u  on date t. Under perfect capital mobility, residents of  two regions should 
end up (in equilibrium) placing the same value on any asset. Interregional 
valuation discrepancies would  therefore be  evidence of  barriers to capital 
movement-barriers  whose origins are, perhaps, bureaucratic, cultural, or 
informational. 
Stepping away from this rarefied setting, it is easy to see how government 
interventions, actual or prospective, can lead to cross-border differences in 
asset valuations. Take as an example of an asset a one-deutschemark deposit 
in Frankfurt maturing in six months. If  i,,  is the six-month nominal interest 
rate, and if bank failure is temporarily ruled out, this asset is a promise to pay 
1 + i,,  deutschemarks into a Frankfurt account in  all states of  nature six 
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months from the deposit date. Imagine that there is some possibility that the 
German government will impose a regulation preventing foreigners from re- 
patriating their interest earnings, but leaving them free to spend the interest 
within Germany. In general, this possibility will cause the value of Frankfurt 
deposits carrying a given interest rate to be lower for foreigners than for Ger- 
mans. The result might be asset-market segmentation. 
Frankel offers four possible definitions of perfect capital mobility, but none 
of  them, not even covered interest parity, corresponds to the asset-valuation 
criterion described above. Covered interest parity between New  York  dollar 
deposits and London sterling deposits, with cover purchased in London, pre- 
dicts that promises to deliver a dollar on a given date in the future in New York 
should sell for the same price as promises to do the same in London. This 
equality may or may not hold true, and its validity may or may not be related 
to the degree of capital mobility between New York and London. Large dollar 
deposits in New York and Eurodollar deposits in London may offer different 
payoffs in different states of nature because of more stringent prudential regu- 
lation in New York and the consequent relative instability of the Eurocurrency 
system. Yet  an equilibrium in which investors, regardless of country of resi- 
dence, attach a common value to New York deposits of a currency and attach 
a distinct but still common value to London deposits of the same currency is 
perfectly consistent with free international asset trade. 
Alternatively, however, a covered interest differential may indicate genuine 
barriers to capital movement, as Frankel assumes. In a country imposing sig- 
nificant costs on cross-border financial flows, domestic residents’ valuation of 
any state-contingent money payment will generally differ from that of foreign- 
ers, and, as a result, onshore and offshore interest rates will generally differ as 
well. 
Frankel’s covered interest parity calculations are motivated by the desire to 
compare the prices of assets that are as similar as possible, except for their 
locations. The reasoning underlying this comparison is that, absent locality- 
specific  risks  and  regulations  that  affect  foreign  and  domestic  residents 
equally, the answer one gets is close to what one would get from a comparison 
of different investors’ valuation of the same asset. Despite the reservations just 
expressed, I agree with Frankel that the approach of comparing onshore with 
1. Frankel’s use of covered interest parity is really a roundabout way of comparing interest rates 
on (hopefully) similar assets that pay off in the same currency but in different locations. His tests 
rely on the fact that Euromarket deposits of  one currency can be easily transformed into another 
through the forward market.  As a result, one can in principle measure the interest differential 
between London yen and Tokyo yen, say, by comparing the London Eurodollar rate (after cover- 
ing in the London dollar/yen forward market) with the Gensaki rate. The practical problem with 
Frankel’s method is that it introduces additional measurement errors when the forward premium 
and interest rates are measured at different times, as is apparently the case in this study. I would 
therefore prefer, when possible, to work directly with Euroyen rather than covered Eurodollar 
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offshore interest rates is  the most reliable method available for quantifying 
impediments to capital movement. I adopted essentially the same approach in 
my  1986 paper (Obstfeld 1986), and also reached the conclusion that the de- 
gree of financial integration among industrial countries is now very high. But 
I  hope  the  present  discussion  makes  clear  how  approximate  an  answer 
interest-rate comparisons yield. 
Capital Mobility and Economic Policy: The Case of Crowding Out 
While the asset-valuation measure of capital mobility offered above may be 
useful for a detailed theoretical analysis of economic efficiency, it is less use- 
ful for addressing many questions of macroeconomic interest. The problem is 
that to analyze the effects of policies, it is not enough to know only that inves- 
tors in different countries value some identical assets differently. One usually 
needs to know, in addition, why investors’ valuations of the assets differ. 
A simple example focuses on the question of  crowding out, which moti- 
vated the Feldstein-Horioka (1980) study. Feldstein and  Horioka reasoned 
that, under perfect capital mobility, changes in a country’s saving rate should 
not affect its investment rate. Because investment projects can be financed out 
of a global pool of internationally mobile savings, saving shifts within a par- 
ticular country should not crowd out (or crowd in) domestic investment. 
Consider a small country that would be a capital importer under laisser- 
faire.2  The assumption that this country would run a deficit on current account 
under free asset trade means that, in the presence of  restrictions on foreign 
borrowing, its interest rate exceeds the world interest rate. The observation 
that the interest rate its residents face differs from that faced by foreigners is 
not enough to determine whether a fall in national saving would crowd out 
domestic investment. Two  possible situations are (1) the country’s govern- 
ment has imposed a nonprohibitive tariff on capital imports and (2) the gov- 
ernment has placed a binding quantitative limit on capital imports. In either 
of these cases, the domestic interest rate is above the world interest rate. But 
in case 1,  a small fall in national saving has no crowding out effect at all; in a 
certain sense, capital remains fully mobile at the margin despite the interna- 
tional interest differential. In contrast, a decline in saving crowds out invest- 
ment point for point in case 2. 
Even if potential interest-arbitrage  opportunities are absent, or if the causes 
generating them are known, policy effects obviously may still depend on the 
economy’s structure. An  economy large enough to affect the world interest 
rate will show a different degree of crowding out than a small economy. As 
2. For the purpose of this example, think of a world with one commodity on each date. Then 
“the” real  interest rate is just the  price of present output in terms of  future output, less one. 
(International real interest differentials, to  be discussed below, can arise in this setting only as a 
result of impediments to international asset trade.) The underlying model I have in mind here is 
Irving Fisher’s  two-period model of  investment and saving under conditions of full employment. 264  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Frankel notes, an economy where the expected real interest rate varies with 
goods-market prices may behave differently from one in which purchasing 
power parity holds ex ante. 
In  attempts to determine empirically  such  parameters as  the degree of 
crowding out in an open economy, asset-valuation comparisons can therefore 
be beside the point,  if  not misleading. In most cases, a direct econometric 
attack on the problem of interest is preferable. As  Frankel’s own analysis of 
crowding out indicates, however, the design of appropriate estimation strate- 
gies may not be easy. 
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) were the first to attempt to measure the degree 
of crowding out by regressions of investment rates on saving rates. Their find- 
ing of near-unit coefficients (a result weakened by more recent data) reflected 
a  stylized fact  that  calls out  for explanation,  the typically small sizes of 
current-account imbalances in the postwar period through the early  1980s. 
Their interpretation of the finding, that imperfect capital mobility causes most 
of a change in saving to be reflected in the home capital stock, has been widely 
criticized. My  1986 paper made the theoretical argument that even under cap- 
ital mobility, high saving-investment correlations could result from common 
factors affecting both saving and investment at the same time. Later on I eval- 
uate Frankel’s claim that the most important common factor is the domestic 
real interest rate. 
Frankel apparently rejects the view that investment-saving regressions mea- 
sure capital mobility, but he accepts them as a valid way to measure the effect 
of exogenous shifts in saving on investment, provided instrumental variables 
are used to correct for the endogeneity of  saving3  He interprets time-series 
regressions based on U.S. saving and investment data as evidence that for the 
United States, the crowding out effect has become dramatically smaller over 
the past decade. 
A Model of Saving and Investment 
It is difficult to evaluate Frankel’s interpretation of the regression results 
outside the context of a specific model. One standard model shows quite eas- 
ily that Frankel’s estimated coefficients need not consistently measure the de- 
gree of  crowding out, despite the use of  exogenous instrumental variables 
correlated with saving. Further, the coefficients estimated are vulnerable to 
the Lucas critique: they change with changes in the stochastic processes driv- 
ing the model’s exogenous variables. This vulnerability makes the estimates 
potentially unstable and thus particularly misleading as guides to policy. 
My exemplary full-employment model is a variant of one used for a similar 
purpose by Feldstein (1983), though the original source is probably Metzler 
3. This procedure was proposed in Frankel (1986). Frankel also attempts to adjust for cyclical 
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(1960). If r is the domestic real interest rate and u an exogenous disturbance, 
then the share of saving in output is given by 
S,lY, = ax, + br, + u,, 
where all variables are deviations from (unconditional)  means and coefficients 
are positive. In equation (l),  the variable x is Frankel’s instrumental variable, 
which influences saving but is uncorrelated with all the model’s disturbances. 
The investment rate depends on r plus an investment shock v, 
I,IY, = -dr,  + v, 
Capital inflows are modeled so as to reflect the possibility of imperfect mo- 
bility. Let r* be an exogenously varying world real interest rate, expressed in 
terms of foreign output. If  q is the relevant real exchange rate (the price of 
foreign output in terms of domestic, expressed as a natural logarithm), then 
desired net capital inflows (scaled by output) should depend on the difference 
between the domestic real interest rate r and the expected rate of  return on 
foreign investment expressed in terms of  domestic output, 
(3) 
where w is an exogenous disturbance to capital inflows. Asfgrows arbitrarily 
large, the condition 
which defines perfect capital mobility in this model, is approached. 
poraneous real exchange rate and an international-trade  shock z, 
Finally, the current-account surplus is modeled as a function of the contem- 
(4)  CA,IY, = eq, + z,. 
In equilibrium, any current account imbalance must be financed by net capital 
flows, so 
CA, + K, = 0. 
To  close the model, one supplements this requirement of flow consistency in 
the balance of payments with the output-market equilibrium condition: 
S, -  I, = CA,. 
The foregoing model neglects some important dynamic elements, such as 
the  intrinsic dynamics due to  cumulating asset  stocks or possible lagged 
current-account adjustment to real exchange-rate changes. It is nevertheless 
useful as kind of first-order approximation, one that hopefully captures the 
main factors behind medium-term comovements of  interest rates,  real ex- 
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The Model's Solution 
The equilibrium real exchange rate is found using the usual solution tech- 
nique  for  rational-expectations models.  Define  the  composite  disturbance 
n, as 
(7) 
and define the parameter h as h = (b + d)/[(b  + d) + (e/f)(b  + d + f)]. 
Then (5)  and (6) imply that the real exchange rate is a convergent infinite sum, 
(8) 
As usual, the relation of q, to the exogenous shocks that define the composite 
variable n, depends on the serial-correlation properties of  those shocks. To 
illustrate the pitfalls in Frankel's estimation approach, however, I assume for 
now that the instrumental variable x follows a martingale process, and there- 
fore is rationally expected to remain at its current level; all other random var- 
iables on the right-hand side of (7) are assumed to be white noise. Under these 
assumptions, 
q, = (f/e)ax,/(b  + d + f) + (terms in r:, etc.), 
n, = r,* + (ax, + U, - v,)/(b + d) 
-  w,/f - (b + d + f)z,/f(b  + d), 
4, = ",  + hE,(n, + 1)  + h2E,(n,  + 2)  + h3E,(n,  + 3)  +  . . . I. 
and (by [5])  the domestic real interest rate is 
(9) 
reduced-form saving and investment equations, 
(10)  S,/Y, = (d + f)m,/(b  + d + f) + (terms in rT, etc.), 
(1  1)  I,/Y, = dax,/(b + d + f) + (terms in r:, etc.). 
Equation (1  1) makes transparent the effect of  an exogenous and permanent 
shift in  saving on the investment rate.  Given the specification (l), an ex- 
ogenous shift in saving can arise from a permanent shift in ax,  or in u,. The 
variable  ax,,  changes  in  which  are  permanent,  carries  the  coefficient 
d/(b + d + f) in (1  l),  so this coefficient tells us, for example, the amount of 
investment crowded out by  a permanent autonomous decline in the saving 
rate. Notice that even under complete capital immobility cf = 0), crowding 
out is less than complete provided saving is interest sensitive (b > 0). The 
reason is that an exogenous negative saving shift raises the home interest rate, 
causing equilibrium saving (and hence investment) to fall by less.4  Under per- 
r, =  -ax,/@  + d + f) + (terms in r:, etc.). 
Solution (9) may now be combined with equations (1) and (2) to find the 
4. This fact shows, already, that one cannot interpret a simple saving-investment correlation as 
measuring the extent of crowding out. Even in an  economy where capital controls lead to a perfect 
correlation between saving and investment, the effect on investment of an  exogenous saving shift 
is reduced by  a partially  offsetting change in  the endogenous,  interest-sensitive component of 
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fect capital mobility (an infinite  f),  however, exogenous shifts in  saving do 
not affect investment provided the shifts are permanent. 
Do the Instrumental-Variable Estimates Measure Crowding Out? 
We  can now ask whether an instrumental-variable  (IV) regression of invest- 
ment on saving produces a consistent estimate of the policy coefficient of in- 
terest, d/(b + d + f).  Equations (10) and (1  1) lead to a clear negative an- 
swer for the present model. 
This can be seen as follows. If  the instrumental variable x is uncorrelated 
with all the model’s disturbances, as Frankel assumes, and with the world 
interest rate r*, then (10) shows that a first-stage regression of S/Y on x yields 
a consistent estimate of the coefficient (d + f)a/(b  + d + f).  The reduced 
form equation for investment, (1 l),  therefore can be rewritten as 
(12)  ZJY,  = [d/(d + f)](SiY,)  + (terms orthogonal to x,), 
where (S,iY,)  is the fitted value from the first-stage regression of SIY on x. 
Equation (1  2) is the regression that is run to obtain the IV estimate of the 
crowding  out  coefficient, d/(b + d + f);  however,  the  resulting  estimate 
clearly converges in probability, not to d/(b + d  + f),  but to the larger num- 
ber d/(d + f). The econometric pitfalls of  regressing investment on saving 
apparently go deeper than the observation that saving needs an exogenous 
instrument. Here,  an issue of  equation specification is also involved. The 
“structural” equation for I/Y in which S/Y appears on the right-hand side with 
coefficient d/(b + d  + f)  also involves x as a separate regressor. The impli- 
cation is that x is not really a valid instrument for the purpose at hand, despite 
its lack of correlation with the model’s di~turbances.~ 
The following conclusions can be  drawn from this analysis: (1) IV esti- 
mates such as those Frankel presents may overstate the degree to which ex- 
ogenous saving shifts affect investment. This overstatement is large when d 
andf  are small relative to 6. (2) There are some special cases in which IV is 
appropriate in the above example. One occurs when saving is not interest sen- 
sitive (b = 0), a situation many view as plausible on  empirical, if  not on 
theoretical, grounds. (In the present model, the saving rate is an exogenous 
variable if b = 0.)  The IV method is also appropriate when investment is not 
interest sensitive (d = 0), but in this case exogenous saving shifts leave in- 
vestment unchanged regardless of the degree of  capital mobility. Finally, the 
IV estimator “works” in  this specific example if  one wishes to test the null 
hypothesis of perfect capital mobility (an infinitef).  But if that hypothesis is 
rejected, inferences about crowding out require additional information. (3) 
Changes over time in the IV coefficient do reflect changes in the degree of 
capital mobility and in the degree of crowding out-other  things the same. If 
5,  Equivalently, the crowding-out coefficient is not generally identified (despite the availability 
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f,  rises, for example, both the degree of crowding out and the IV coefficient 
fall. (4) One should not take the calculation above too literally as an indication 
of the biases due to IV estimation. In reality, shocks to x  may be transitory; 
the instrument x may be correlated with the world interest rate r*; or some 
model other than the one sketched above may be relevant. Any of these depar- 
tures from my simplifying assumptions would change the analysis. 
As an illustration of  point 4, imagine that the instrumental variable x  fol- 
lows the first-order autoregression x, = px, - , +  E,, with p strictly between 
0 and  1 and E, - ,(E,)  = 0. In this case, shifts in x are not perceived as per- 
manent. The reduced-form coefficients of  x  in the equations explaining SIY 
and IIY  therefore differ from the ones shown in (10) and (1 l), and can no 
longer be interpreted as measures of  the effects of permanent changes in x. 
Instead, these coefficients reflect the actual persistence of  innovations in x in 
the historical sample. This is just an instance of the Lucas critique: without 
knowledge of structural parameters, it is not generally possible to infer from 
the reduced-form coefficients the effects of permanent shifts in the instrumen- 
tal variable x. 
One might still be interested in knowing the amount of investment crowded 
out over the sample period by  innovations to x. It is easy to show that, once 
again, the IV estimate overstates the true figure when b > 0. With x a station- 
ary process, however, this overstatement occurs even when capital mobility is 
perfect. Furthermore, the IV coefficient now is not asymptotically zero under 
perfect capital mobility, so one cannot test that hypothesis by  looking for a 
zero coefficient.6 
The main message of the example is that the existence of exogenous “in- 
struments” correlated with saving is no panacea in cases of  underidentifica- 
tion. This message applies to cross-section as well as time-series estimation. 
Real Interest Rates, Saving, and Investment 
Regardless of one’s interpretation of  investment-saving regressions, their 
results, as noted above, point to an intriguing empirical regularity: from the 
end of World War I1 up until the early 1980s, current-account deficits tended 
to be quite small compared with national income. Even in the 1980s, major 
industrial countries’ current-account imbalances have not surpassed the levels 
sustained by Great Britain in the decades leading up to World War I. Alterna- 
tive solutions to this “Feldstein-Horioka puzzle” have sharply different impli- 
cations for policy. Presumably, a good explanation should throw light on both 
the short-run time-series behavior of current accounts and the cross-sectional 
coincidence of saving and investment over longer time spans. 
Frankel’s favorite approach rests on the observation that real interest rates 
6. Because it is unlikely that the x process would remain stable over a very long period, it is 
also unlikely that the IV regression coefficient would be stable. This mechanism, rather than shifts 
in capital mobility, could be the main factor behind the striking coefficient instability reported in 
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can differ across countries even when there is uninhibited international asset 
trade. The undeniable fact of real interest differentials does not, however, offer 
an automatic explanation of the Feldstein-Horioka results. Think again about 
the saving-investment model set out above, and consider the case of perfect 
capital mobility. 
The model certainly allows for real interest differentials, yet permanent dis- 
turbances do not give rise to them under perfect capital mobility. This result 
would be attenuated a bit if the model were expanded in a way that endogen- 
ized the process of  asset accumulation; but it is probably not a bad approxi- 
mation to say that permanent shocks have slight effects, compared with tem- 
porary ones, on the rationally expected change in the real exchange rate. 
Because of  their more powerful short-run effect on the real interest rate, 
temporary disturbances can give rise to high correlations between saving and 
investment. For example, if x in (1) follows a first-order autoregression with 
positive autoregressive coefficient p, the IV slope coefficient analyzed above 
converges to d( 1 - p)/[d(  1 -  p)  + e] under perfect capital mobility. This 
coefficient is close to unity when e (the current-account effect of the real ex- 
change rate) is small, and it is larger the smaller the degree of persistence p. 
The foregoing result is still not enough to resolve the Feldstein-Horioka 
puzzle. While temporary shocks to x, u, or v cause saving and investment to 
covary positively, other temporary shocks cause negative covariation. A tem- 
porary positive shock to the trade balance (z in equation [4]) increases the 
domestic real interest rate and therefore causes saving to rise and investment 
to fall. Monetary shocks, if  formally introduced into the model, could also 
cause saving and investment to move in opposite directions. To  explain ob- 
served time-series correlations between saving and investment on the basis of 
real interest differentials, one must therefore argue that direct shocks to the 
saving and investment schedules not only display low persistence, but also are 
the dominant sources of fluctuations. 
A solution to the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle based on temporary shocks to 
saving and investment is deficient in another respect. Since temporary shocks 
tend  to  offset  each  other  over  time,  they  cannot  explain  the  high  cross- 
sectional correlation between long time-averages of  saving and investment 
rates. To  apply the real-interest explanation to the cross-section findings, one 
would need (at the very least) an empirically significant mechanism through 
which persistent shifts in saving or investment rates have persistent effects on 
real interest rates under capital mobility. Stories can certainly be told, but a 
convincing case has yet to be made. I doubt that any single mechanism, out 
of the many that have been proposed, provides a full answer to the puzzle. 
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